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Programme Financing and Public Budgets  
1 Introduction 
For some years now, a reform of important instruments of international development co-
operation has been taking place. In this, public budgets and their financing from outside 
play a decisive role. Budget support and other forms of programme financing (Program-
Based Approaches – PBAs) have become a central building block of the new development 
cooperation. 
Individual donors, such as the British Department for International Development (DFID), 
the Netherlands, the European Union and the World Bank are pressing for a reform of 
development cooperation and a consistent implementation of PBAs. Moreover, wide con-
sensus, though not shared by all, exists meanwhile about the necessity to increase the ef-
fectiveness of development cooperation by means of such newer approaches. 
While the importance of budget management and support extends beyond the African con-
tinent, it plays a particularly important role in the countries of sub-Saharan-Africa (SSA). 
Here, economic efficiency and above all public budgets depend to a significant extent on 
development cooperation. In part, clearly more than 50 % of public spending by central 
governments is donor-financed. At the same time, for donors, SSA is in many respects the 
“key continent” for development policy efforts. 
The Strategic Partnership for Africa (SPA), which has as an objective a more effective 
development cooperation with African countries and is headed by the World Bank’s Vice 
President for Africa, Callisto Madavo, already formulated a very wide-ranging principle 
back in November 2001: “All donor assistance should be delivered through government 
systems unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary; where this is not possible, 
any alternative mechanisms or safeguards must be time-limited, and develop and build, 
rather than undermine or bypass, government systems” (LENPA 2002, 10 f.). In fact, a 
consistent implementation of this so-called Addis-Ababa principle would lead to signifi-
cant changes in development cooperation with Africa. 
Finally, it must be emphasised that a series of cooperation partners expressly call upon the 
community of donors to adapt and adjust their development cooperation approaches to the 
partner structures and processes. Uganda and Ethiopia are examples of partners expressly 
expecting donors to act within the respective national budgets (on budget) and structures, 
instead of maintaining parallel structures and working outside of the respective public 
budgets (off budget). 
After an introductory summary of the constitutive elements of PBAs, this article will first 
of all discuss the adjustments that are necessary on the donor side to support program-
matic approaches as effectively as possible. In this, the main focus of the analysis will be 
on the conditionalities that accompany the financing of PBAs. Afterwards, the central de-
mands made on structures and processes for a successful implementation of PBAs in de-
veloping countries are discussed. At the centre of our attention are the budgets whose 
structuring and quality are essential for the implementation of poverty reduction strategies. 
Finally, the experience that has been gained with PBAs to date will be summarised and 
explained. 
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2 Programme financing and budget support 
2.1 What are PBAs? 
PBAs can be understood as programmatic approaches that have a clearly recognisable con-
ceptual roof, are answered for, endorsed and managed by the partner countries (including 
the effective co-ordination of donors) and supported by donors that adjust their behaviour to 
the concept (Klingebiel 2003, 5). A central reference document for the support within the 
context of PBAs is – where it exists – the national poverty strategy (Poverty Reduction 
Strategy – PRS).1
On the same lines as the CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), in this, 
four principles must be taken into consideration (CIDA 2003): 
— Leadership of the programme by the partner country, 
— A single programme with a common budget framework, 
— Donor coordination and harmonization of procedures, 
— Efforts to increase the use of the processes and instruments by the partner, inter alia 
with regard to implementation, financial management, and monitoring and evalua-
tion. 
The financial support of the programmatic approaches can be given in the form of general 
budget support – which the article primarily considers –, sector-related budget support or 
through joint financing (basket funding or common pools) (see Overview 1). Besides the 
actual financial contributions by donors, PBAs also comprise such measures that serve to 
improve the administration and control of the resources made available, as well as the total 
budget.2
The international trend to programme orientation results from the endeavour towards 
greater effectiveness of development cooperation. PBAs are intended to counteract the 
administrative and organizational problems that are created by the project approaches pre-
viously followed by most donors. The community of donors currently finances a total of 
around 50,000 development cooperation projects and programmes (OECD / DAC 2003, 
47). According to conservative estimates (Club du Sahel 2000, 7), in a “typical” African 
country, there are around 600 ongoing development cooperation projects (in the case of 
Burkina Faso, for example, there are currently 1500 projects), for which each year around 
2400 quarterly reports must be drawn up, which in turn must be administered by the com-
petent administrative units of the respective country. In addition, there are about 1000 an-
nual missions, which make necessary corresponding spending for their preparation and 
implementation. Each mission would like to conduct talks with high-ranking representa-
tives of the partner country and obtain government estimates for its own report. PBAs are 
intended to provide a remedy especially in this area and contribute to a conceptual and 
                                                 
1 To date, PRS have been developed or already implemented in 54 countries; 38 countries have a complete 
PRS paper (PRSP) or comparable strategy document (status: June 2004). Originally relevant merely as a 
precondition for a debt relief under the HIPC initiative, PRS are meanwhile considered as the central stra-
tegic frame of reference for the own efforts of the poorest developing counties to combat poverty and reach 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) up to 2015. 
2 Cf. on this Klingebiel (2003, 5 f.); Leiderer (2004, 1 f.). 
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Figure 1: From project-orientation to programme financing in development cooperationa
Traditional project financing 
⇓ 
Project-related contributions to the programme of the partner 
⇓ 
Project-related contributions with donor-harmonised procedures and standards to a  
programme of the partner 
⇓ 
Joint financing of a donor-controlled basket 
⇓ 
Joint financing of a jointly (donor and partner)-controlled basket 
⇓ 
Joint financing of a partner-controlled basket 
⇓ 
Sector-related budget support 
⇓ 
General budget support 
a Categories as per: Foster / Leavy 2001; Asche / Lauckner 2002, 13 
Source: Klingebiel 2003, 9 
administrative relief of the partners. Moreover, the selective support of partner pro-
grammes is also intended to lead to an improvement in the ownership, hence the commit-
ment of the partners to implement the strategies resolved. Likewise, PBAs are intended to 
bring about a greater results-orientation in the planning, implementation and evaluation of 
development cooperation. 
Criticism of PBAs, on the other hand, relates to deficient budget management and ac-
counting structures in many of the partner countries stated further below. Budget support 
and similar instruments are considered to be very difficult to account for due to the high 
risk of their being diverted from their intended use and a misappropriation of the funds 
(see Box 1). On the other hand, a possible difficulty here is that such criticism hardly ever 
gives meaningful answers to the question as to what form a “bailing out“ of the budget 
support – for example if the partner government makes incomprehensible purchases of 
armaments – might take. If, for example, areas of basic health care were no longer fi-
nanced due to the cessation of budget support, a new quality of responsibility would 
emerge on the donor side. 
To achieve the objectives of programme orientation, an adjustment of financing mecha-
nisms and in particular the conditionalities accompanying these is necessary on the donor 
side. On the partner countries’ side, on the other hand, first and foremost a new course in 
the area of policy formulation and budget management must be set, in order to guarantee 
the success of PBAs. 
German Development Institute 3
Stephan Klingebiel / Stefan Leiderer / Petra Schmidt 
Box 1: Fungibility of development cooperationa
Development cooperation is described as fungible if, due to the support, it becomes possible for the partner 
side to reduce its own spending for the anticipated purpose. The funds saved may then in principle be used 
for another purpose. It must be emphasised here that project-related or sector-specific approaches can by no 
means guarantee that the fungibility problems will become less important.b 
For example: development cooperation funds made available to one country for the educational sector (for 
example: the building of schools) may lead to a situation in which, in the budget of the partner country, it 
would be possible to save one part, or if necessary the whole of the education budget at this place and, at 
another place, to carry out spending (in the area of education or in other sectors) or savings in the budget. To 
what extent the fungibility effect in the individual case contributes to a situation in which spending for de-
velopment policy priorities is only partially or even completely not carried out additionally depends on the 
specific conditions. Empirical investigations give proof of very different effects. 
Whether the budgetary funds of the respective country and development cooperation resources are being 
used fungibly is only verifiable within the framework of the overall budget procedure.c Advocates of PBA 
see here an important preference for the approach, since it attaches great importance to the budget process. 
a The World Bank study “Assessing Aid – What Works, What Doesn't and Why” provides a good overview 
of the subject: World Bank 1998, 60 ff. and 130 ff. See also: Foster / Leavy 2001, 14. 
b Cf. World Bank 1998, 72 ff.; Devarajan / Haque 2002, 6 f. 
c Cf. e.g. Dutch Foreign Ministry 2001, 11 f. 
Source: Klingebiel 2003, 11 
2.2 Conditionality and ownership in the context of PBAs 
At the international level, consensus has existed since the end of the 1990s that condition-
ality in the traditional sense has not been successful. Questions about what form a reform 
of  conditionality in the context of PBAs might best take or whether conditionality should 
be dispensed with completely have, however, still not been debated conclusively. PBAs 
are based on the conviction that untargeted aid for good policy strategies of the partners is 
more efficient than aid in the form of projects. A basic renunciation of conditionality is, 
however, – not foreseen in the PBAs, independently of whether this relates to loans or 
grants. Doubts about traditional conditionality stemmed from the economic policy condi-
tions of the structural adjustment programmes that were connected with the payment of 
the funds: 
— Firstly, the conditionalities were frequently similar to theoretical blueprints that 
were only inadequately adjusted to local conditions (Wood / Lockwood 1999, 6). 
Central contents were generally a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, the applica-
tion of market economy principles and the withdrawal of the state. Through this, 
economic growth was intended to be promoted and sooner or later benefit poor peo-
ple. Critics have their doubts about the economic meaningfulness of this approach 
and point to the negative economic, ecological and social consequences of structural 
adjustment. 
— Secondly, the conditionalities were often too detailed. Combined with a lack of co-
ordination between the individual donors, in the final outcome, often incoherent and 
largely incredible conditionalities were formulated, which were viewed by the host 
countries rather as a necessary evil than as useful reforms (Adam et. al. 2004, 2). 
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Correspondingly small was the will of the partners to implement the policy reforms 
promised beforehand in a consistent manner. 
— Thirdly, the omnipresent pressure of outflowing funds led to a high degree of indul-
gence on the part of the donors, which further undermined the credibility of the con-
ditionality. 
— Fourthly, the “all-or-nothing approach” is characterizing a system, in which the 
funds or tranches had either been distributed in the full amount or completely frozen, 
hindered a continuous reform process in the partner countries. 
— Fifthly, the traditional policy of constraints dispensed with a sufficient ownership by 
the host countries for the reforms, since those constraints were specified from out-
side. Sufficient ownership and commitment are especially essential, however, for the 
success of reforms. Ordered measures that were not jointly endorsed by the national 
stakeholders have not been able to influence national policies on a permanent basis. 
As a response to the criticism of structural adjustment, the International Financial Institu-
tions (IFIs) resolved at their annual meeting in 1999 to implement a clearer poverty-
orientation of their services, which in future should rely on the national PRS. The previous 
structural adjustment credits of the World Bank were replaced by the Poverty Reduction 
Support Credit (PRSC). The IMF replaced its previous Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF) by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Through their 
clear commitment to combating poverty, the IFIs have set an important example. How-
ever, the conditions of PRGF and PRSC are still very similar to traditional structural ad-
justment, “garnished with some measures, which benefit poor people or are intended to 
spare these” (Eberlei / Siebert 2002, 51). In addition, the quality of the public financial 
management has become a central concern of the donors and is continuously demanded. 
Without doubt, poverty-oriented and efficient budget management is essential for the im-
plementation of the PRSPs. Concrete specifications in relation to budget planning and 
execution etc., however, always also signify a significant encroachment upon the sover-
eignty of the partners, which could have a negative impact on the host countries’ own re-
sponsibility for the reform programmes. 
To promote the ownership of the partners in PBAs and overcome the shortcomings of 
traditional conditionality, besides (re)-orientation to the contents of PRS, there are other 
reform proposals that in part signify considerable changes in the financing modalities. 
A first reform proposal wishes to link the aid to results and not as previously to political 
measures. The traditional ex-ante conditionality is to be replaced by a performance-based 
ex-post conditionality. Such a refashioning of conditionality is in tune with the basic ef-
forts for a greater result-orientation of the development cooperation. The precursor of this 
approach is the European Commission, which first implemented performance-based 
tranches in its budget support programmes in 1999 and since then has successively re-
formed the granting of budget support. Disbursements now depend on a limited number of 
outcome indicators, through which the outcomes of the policy are recorded and evaluated 
at the level of the user (European Commission 2002). Outcome indicators used most fre-
quently are e.g. school enrolment rates or the number of births accompanied by medical 
personnel. The indicators and target values steered for are selected in the dialogue with the 
partner government and in a typical ideal case this is derived from the PRSP or compara-
ble strategies. How the defined goals and objectives may best be achieved i.e. what policy 
measures are implemented for these is determined by the government independently. The 
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intention here is to strengthen ownership and improve national accountability. If the out-
comes steered for are not reached, this will entail a reduction in the performance-based 
tranche and not as previously a payment stop. The “all-or-nothing approach”, which has 
led to strong fluctuations in the funding flows, thus yields to a gradual approach and the 
scope of the funding can be calculated better for the partner government. Up to the end of 
2003, the European Commission approved about 30 budget support programmes in the 
ACP states (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific), which contain performance-based elements. 
Other donors attempt to increase the ownership of the partners by structuring the tiering of 
the tranches and programme phases in such a way that the partner countries are given 
more scope in the implementation of the reforms. In the case of the floating tranche fre-
quently used by the World Bank, the host countries decide independently about the time at 
which they introduce the reforms stipulated in advance and thus initiate a disbursement of 
the funds. In this way, the donors evade the dilemma either to interrupt the programmes 
entirely or tolerate unfulfilled conditionalities, thereby rendering doubtful their credibility. 
More recent World Bank approaches (programmatic adjustment lending), which aim at 
supporting the mid-term reform programmes of the partners, consist of several loans, 
which must be approved in advance by the Board of Executive Directors. Measures stipu-
lated in advance, on whose implementation the continued existence of the programme 
depends, can be adjusted flexibly to the given circumstances and their contents can be 
modified in the event of a failure to achieve the defined goals and objectives (World Bank 
2004, 23). 
Besides a more performance-based conditionality or more flexible disbursement mecha-
nisms, some authors prefer to restrict budget support to such countries able to produce 
evidence that they are pursuing “good” policies and which already show sufficient owner-
ship for these policies before granting the budget support.3 A far-reaching renunciation of 
conditionality would be associated with this. The evaluation of the country performance, 
however, contains subjective elements, unless it is based exclusively on quantitatively 
measurable criteria, such as e.g. data on budget allocation. If, on the other hand, the selec-
tion of the country (selectivity) is based on estimates about the relevance and effectiveness 
of policies, it reveals similar fields of tension to the stipulation of conditions. In addition, 
only few countries effect a uniformly good performance in all policy areas (Köberle 2003, 
259). All in all, most countries show a mediocre political performance. A restriction to 
cooperation with countries that implement uniformly “good” policies would reduce the 
number of partners to a mere few and would not be justifiable as a development policy. 
3 Challenge for developing countries: public expenditure management 
However, the success of PBAs depends not only on a greater results-orientation of donor 
contributions and the harmonization and adjustment of their modes of delivery. Rather, the 
                                                 
3 The demand for a critical selection of the partner countries is based above all on the work of Burnside 
and Dollar (2000), who arrive at the conclusion that development cooperation is effective solely subject 
to the condition of “good” policy. An example of development cooperation based on a country selection 
evaluating the policy of the partner is the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). 16 of 63 countries, 
which show a particularly good performance in the areas of legal certainty and economic freedom etc., 
qualified for this fund, which was set up by President Bush, for the budget year 2004 (MCA 2004). 
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new approach also makes considerable demands on systems and processes in developing 
countries. Therefore, public budgets have become a prominent topic in the international 
debate about programme-based development cooperation; for the awareness is growing 
that budgets, their preparation, implementation, and finally the monitoring and control are 
a central element in the political process and for the implementation of poverty reduction 
strategies (de Renzio 2004). In addition, transparency and possibilities to control public 
budgets are decisive for political participation and democratization in developing coun-
tries. 
Through budgets, political priorities are set for the benefit or at the expense of basic social 
welfare services, military spending or of the machinery of public employees. For poverty-
oriented financial management, however, not only the sectoral allocation of domestic and 
externally financed resources is important: as the World Development Report 2004 shows, 
services often fail to reach the poor because it’s predominantly wealthier groups who 
benefit most from public spending. „[…] while governments devote about a third of their 
budgets to health and education, they spend very little of it on poor people. Public spend-
ing on health and education is typically enjoyed by non-poor […]“ (World Bank 2003, 3). 
An assessment carried out jointly by the IMF and World Bank in 2002 regarding the ex-
tent to which the public expenditure management systems in a total of 24 Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC-Countries) allow a tracking of poverty-reducing spending demon-
strates the enormous need for reform in these countries: out of 24 countries, for 15 coun-
tries, a need for “substantial upgrading” of the PEM system was established, the remaining 
nine required “some upgrading” (World Bank / IMF 2002). 
Many of the weaknesses of PEM systems established in the course of such assessments 
are not necessarily specific to developing countries. Rather, they exist in the same or simi-
lar form in most industrialised countries, too. However, due to limited human and techni-
cal capacities, they are much more disruptive in poor countries and correspondingly more 
difficult to come to grips with. 
3.1 The planning problem: from policy formulation to the budget 
For a large number of administrations in developing countries, it is a nearly impossible 
task to translate the national PRS into comprehensive policy programmes and correspond-
ing medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEF) that could provide the basis for sup-
port through PBAs. In most countries, therefore, there is no or only a very limited direct 
relationship between the PRS and the public budget. A DFID study of the Ghanaian 
budget in 2003 comes to the conclusion that out of 30 projects and programmes stated in 
the Medium Term Priority MTP only 3 were consistent with entries in Ghanaian PRSP. 
On the other hand, 49 % of the spending estimated for the same year was attributable to 
programmes not mentioned in the PRSP (Levendo_lu 2003). 
At the same time, the reason for this missing link between the PRS and the budget is not 
necessarily caused by a lack of political will, but rather in insufficient capacities and struc-
tures for public financial management, political planning and budgeting. Frequently, the 
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reason for the lack of relationship between the public budget and the national PRS lies in 
unsuitable budget systems.4 Significant problems in the preparation of the public budget in 
line with the political priorities formulated in the PRS also ensue for developing countries 
in connection with the wide-spread practice of dual budgeting, i.e. separate budgets for 
investment or development and recurrent expenditures. The main problem with dual 
budgeting does not consist in the separate presentation of different types of spending (for 
certain purposes of analysis and control, this is even necessary), but in the separate plan-
ning and budget formulation processes. Frequently, the separate budgets are based on dif-
ferent macroeconomic projections, budget classifications and accounting systems, which 
complicates the reconciliation of the overall budget as well as realistic estimation of the 
subsequent costs of investments (cf. Ramakrishnan 1998, 16). In addition, often there is an 
administrative separation of the respective responsibilities between the ministry of finance 
and a planning ministry, through which the mentioned planning problems become even 
more important. 
3.2 Planning under uncertainty: the dependency of public budgets on external 
factors 
A further considerable problem for PFM in developing countries is the great reliance of 
the public revenues on external conditions and on factors beyond the control of national 
governments. Due to the weak economic basis, the importance of the informal sector and 
the limited capacities of the tax administrations, many countries have to resort largely to 
the taxation of international trade to generate public revenues. Accordingly, the develop-
ment of public revenues in most developing countries depends to a significant extent on 
factors that are difficult to predict, let alone influence by the national governments, par-
ticularly on the developments in the world markets and in other countries and regions. As 
a result, key tasks of PFM, such as the annual budgeting and the mid-and short-term bal-
ancing of public revenues and spending become significantly more difficult. 
The same applies to the heavy reliance of most countries on bilateral and multilateral do-
nors for the financing of government spending. The ratio of ODA funds to the gross na-
tional income in sub-Saharan Africa in 2002 was on average 6.3 %. Countries such as Ma-
lawi, Rwanda and Zambia even reached values of up to 20 %. Even more important for 
the management problem governments and administrations in developing countries face 
due to the great reliance on donor financing  is the share of public expenditures funded by 
donors. This share is usually difficult to estimate, since, as a rule, corresponding data is 
only available for the budget of the central government. In most developing countries, 
however, a considerable share of both own and donor-financed funds is spent locally at the 
provincial, district and community level. For those countries in sub-Saharan Africa for 
                                                 
4 This is particularly true if a lack of technical and human capacities does not permit a classification of 
budget items by programmes and activities (cost units) and as a consequence the allocation of funds is 
carried out solely according to cost centres, eventually further disaggregated according to cost type. 
Such budgeting systems render both budget planning as well as the monitoring and evaluation of the 
budget execution in line with the PRS-virtually impossible. Some developing countries work themselves 
around this problem with so-called virtual poverty funds i.e. the indication of poverty-related expendi-
tures– across sectors, administrative units and the type of costs. While such virtual funds can to a limited 
extent serve to inventarize the poverty-orientation of the public budget, they cannot provide for a sys-
tematic implementation and control of the PRS through coherent government programmes and projects. 
 German Development Institute 8 
Programme Financing and Public Budgets  
which such data is available, the amount of ODA in proportion to central government ex-
penditures fluctuated between 9.6 % in Côte d’Ivoire and 65.5 % in Uganda in the year 
2002 (World Bank 2004, 335 f.). 
Correspondingly, managing the various donor contributions is a central element of Public 
Financial Management in many developing countries. The particular challenges differ 
according to what form (projects, joint financing, general or sector budget support etc.) the 
donors deliver their contributions. In the case of project-based support, the institutions in 
the recipient countries concerned with PFM frequently find themselves confronted with 
the necessity to establish a large number of parallel structures and processes in order to 
comply with the respective administration and control requirements of the different do-
nors. While joint financing and budget support disburden the scarce administration and 
control capacities of the partner country partly insofar as these parallel structures can be 
eliminated, conversely, however, the partner governments at the same time face a much 
more complex planning problem, which results from the amount of financing made avail-
able in the form of budget support being largely unknown when drawing up the national 
budget  
On the one hand, this is due to the fact that donor contributions are in part linked to condi-
tionalities and therefore, can be subject to reductions in the course of the financial year. 
The gradual approach of the EU described above represents an improvement in this re-
spect. Moreover, the disbursement schedules of donors are usually not synchronized with 
the national budget calendars, with the result that the annual budget planning in the recipi-
ent countries often has to take place under conditions of considerable uncertainty about the 
funds actually available in the upcoming financial year. 
Financial contributions of donors engaging in PBAs can therefore not be taken into con-
sideration consistently when allocating expenditures to the individual sectors and pro-
grammes according to strategic priorities. Most notably the World Bank and the EU in-
creasingly make efforts to synchronise their disbursements with the national calendars, in 
most cases, however, this adjustment has only just begun. 
3.3 The problem of implementation: PFM in developing countries 
Planning problems of the kind described above often result in significant deviations be-
tween the expenditures provided for in the budget and actual spending in the course 
budget execution, both in respect of the absolute amount and the allocation of funds be-
tween and within the individual sectors to individual government programmes and proj-
ects. Thus, for example, the difference between budgeted and actual expenditures in the 
1990s averaged more than 50 % in Tanzania and more than 30 % in Uganda (Ramakrish-
nan 1998, 6). An analysis of Public Expenditure Reviews for countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa in 1999 came to the conclusion that in 22 % of the countries under investigation the 
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deviation of actual from spent amounts government spending was more than 30 %, in 
33 % differences between 10 and 30 % and in 44 % differences below 10 % were found.5
Besides a lack of planning capacities, it is especially the fiduciary risks inherent to the 
political and administrative system that lead to a misuse of public funds; for an effective 
control by government and administrative agencies, audit offices, parliaments and civil 
society hardly takes place at all in most developing countries and political or legal sanc-
tions for non-compliance with the budget usually don’t exist (Kristopoulos 1999, 21 f.). 
The case of public spending on education in Uganda in the 1990s is a regularly cited ex-
ample of the lack of accountability resulting from the absence of sanction mechanisms in 
the public sector. A tracking survey in the year 1996 showed that between 1991 and 1995 
only 13 % of government’s non-wage expenditure for primary education actually reached 
primary schools, i.e. 87 % of the funds were either used by public officials for uses unre-
lated to education or captured for private gain. The relatively simple countermeasure to 
strengthen the accountability of district officials vis-à-vis the central government and 
above all the population through the publication of the resources designated for each 
school in local newspapers, through the announcement in radio and through printed no-
tices at the local schools proved to be extremely effective: random tests showed that in the 
years 1999 and 2000 the proportion of money reaching the schools had increased to 80 to 
90 % (Leiderer 2004, 21). 
3.4 The role of the donors: diagnostics and PFM reform 
In view of the many weaknesses of PFM-systems in developing countries and their key 
role for the implementation of poverty reduction strategies, the analysis and evaluation of 
the institutions and processes involved in the budget cycle, has become an important ele-
ment of the PBAs. Both the decision regarding the scope and modes of delivery of donor 
support and the formulation of conditionalities depend crucially on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the PFM-system diagnosed in each case; for in particular for donors provid-
ing budget support there are significant risks that the funds made available by them will 
not be used, or not used efficiently for the intended purposes. In order to assess these risks 
realistically and manage them effectively through appropriate conditionalities and the 
support of necessary reforms, a systematic analysis of PFM and its deficiencies is key. 
But a comprehensive analysis of the public financial management systems may also be 
required for tracking whether the funds made available were used by the partner govern-
ment for the intended purposes; this applies above all – and this is usually the case – if 
performance indicators for subsequent disbursements or new financial resources are 
agreed. Besides the evaluation of the fiduciary risks, the systematic assessment of a coun-
try’s PFM-system also serves to identify the concrete reform needs and thus as a basis for 
a comprehensive reform programme. Also, effective monitoring and evaluation of such 
reforms requires a systematic analysis of the institutional structures and the efficiency of 
                                                 
5 Deviations of sector allocation of more than 30 % were observed for 54 % of the sample in the educa-
tion sector, for 57 % in the health sector, for 36 % in infrastructure and for 44 % in agriculture. Cf. 
World Bank (1999). 
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the PFM-system. In this regard, PFM diagnostics constitute an important element of the 
political dialogue between donors and partner governments in the context of PBAs. 
To satisfy their information needs, various bi- and multinational donors – above all the 
IMF and the World Bank – as well as a number of international forums and networks are 
concerned with the development and use of analytical frameworks and diagnostic tools to 
assess PFM-systems in developing countries. By now, there is a whole bundle of analyti-
cal instruments, which each satisfy more or less clearly defined elements of PFM.6 At the 
same time, however, the use of many different instruments causes serious co-ordination 
problems which leads to significant duplications for donors; Still worse, it tends to over-
stretch partner countries’ scarce capacity through uncoordinated donor missions and as-
sessments, which often results in a large number of frequently incompatible recommenda-
tions and reform proposals (Leiderer 2004, 52). 
At the same time, however, donors also neglect important areas of PFM in their analyses. 
This applies in particular to the revenue side of the public budget, to politically sensitive 
areas such as defence and security budgets, and to PFM at the local level. The neglect of 
sub-national levels of government can be particularly problematic given the increasing 
importance of local authorities for the implementation of poverty reduction strategies not 
least due to donors’ massive support of the decentralization processes in many developing 
countries. 
Another problem is that most donors focus their analyses almost exclusively on the 
evaluation of fiduciary risks paying only limited attention to the partner perspective and 
the development of comprehensive reform strategies. Donors increasingly acknowledge 
these criticisms and there is widespread agreement that a pure risk assessment of donors 
providing budget support should no longer take centre stage in future diagnostic work, but 
more attention must be paid to the joint development of realistic reform strategies and ac-
tion plans for the improvement of the budget management in the partner countries. As a 
consequence, several bilateral and multilateral donor agencies founded the Public Expen-
diture and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Programme, whose main goal consists in the 
development of a comprehensive approach to PFM analysis and reform. This approach is 
based on a Performance Measurement Framework, which consists in a set of PFM per-
formance indicators and which is meant to satisfy the information needs of all donors in-
volved in program-based approaches in a particular country. This way, capacities of the 
partner governments are meant to be freed up and a joint platform for PFM reform may be 
established.  
                                                 
6 Some of the most important diagnostic tools include the Public Expenditure Reviews (PER), Country 
Financial Accountability Assessments (CFAA) and Country Procurement Assessment Reports (CPAR) 
of the World Bank and the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) of the IMF. Cf. 
Leiderer (2004). 
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4 Conclusion: experience with PBAs 
All in all, despite existing deficiencies in the collection of corresponding data, there is a 
trend that furnishes proof of the increase of PBAs in development cooperation.7 In the 9th 
European Development Fund, the EU Commission has made available around 25 % of its 
cooperation with the ACP countries in the form of budget support. The World Bank states 
that programme financing of around 6 % of the total IBRD/IDA loans (financial year 
2000) has in all likelihood risen to 19 % in the financial year 2004. Here, the poverty cred-
its (Poverty Reduction Support Credits – PRSCs) play a significant role in supporting the 
Poverty Reduction Strategies. Moreover, the investment loans, which are increasingly 
associated with sector investment programmes, must be mentioned. The share of budget 
support and other PBAs in British bilateral development cooperation is around 15 %. In 
the context of German bilateral development cooperation, PBAs amounting to around 
EUR 100m are scheduled or have already been implemented. All in all, for most donors, 
the question whether PBAs make any sense is hardly ever raised any more, but they con-
cern themselves rather with the matter of how PBAs can be implemented. For partner 
countries such as Tanzania, where already the largest part of the development cooperation 
(e.g. in the financial year 2002: 58 %) is made available as PBAs (cf. Frantz 2004, 1), this 
trend is of immense importance. 
Against the background of these tendencies, the question arises how the concrete experi-
ence with PBAs has been. It is evident here that to date hardly any critically appraised 
empirical findings at all have been forthcoming. There is therefore no comprehensive 
proof that the advantages hoped for actually occur. Conversely, however, to date no em-
pirical findings have come to light either, which would point to fundamental flaws in the 
approach. 
The discussion currently taking place deals mainly with plausibility arguments and con-
crete, individual experience that was gained with programmes or countries over a shorter 
time period. Since the effects of PBAs hoped for are mainly of a long-term nature - for 
example increased ownership, stronger results-orientation in the case of the partners and 
donors, more effective accounting structures – an actual interim balance is not yet possi-
ble. 
Despite these restrictions, there are, however, a few indications through forums such as 
the Learning Network on Program-Based Approaches (LENPA) or inquiries such as the 
evaluation (OPM/ODI 2003) of general budget support carried out for the DFID and the 
ongoing investigations by USAID (for example on Tanzania). 
Against this background, the findings available can be summarised in six points: 
— Sufficient commitment and ownership by the partner are essential. PBAs cannot be 
far-reaching and successful in the long-term if these preconditions are not satisfied 
by the partner. The most favourable preconditions, for example in Uganda and 
Ethiopia are not comparable to those in various countries in West Africa. On the 
other hand, however, it is also evident in difficult countries that, under rather unfa-
vourable conditions, programme-orientation is perfectly possible, for example 
                                                 
7 The following data relates to the information made available by the LENPA forums (Learning Network 
on Program-Based Approaches). 
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through joint financing. The conditionalities for grants and credits must be adjusted 
accordingly so as not to undermine the ownership of the partners. 
— The fiduciary risks of budget support are great even in the positive examples of 
countries such as Uganda. PBAs depend crucially on the partner side “going along 
with it”. Should this not be the case, the question is raised how development coop-
eration can “bail out” again, for example in situations where a great responsibility 
was assumed through budget support. On the other hand, these considerations show 
that the usage of PBAs is very much more noticeable and visible and it is precisely 
here that the potential exists. In addition, even in the case of project-related proce-
dures, the risks are partly considerable and the success depends quite significantly 
on the respective outline conditions. 
— The partner side must establish sufficient capacities in order to be able to develop, 
implement and evaluate strategies. Most important here are the willingness and abil-
ity to improve public budget management and the accounting structures. 
— PBAs can lead to visible results in the formulation of policies by the partners. Due to 
the co-ordinated procedure of the donor, the partly considerable volume of the funds 
and the discussions regarding central policies (see also poverty strategies and sec-
toral policies), as well as the integration of public budget management, the devel-
opment cooperation interventions are calculated to exercise a noticeable and positive 
influence. Evidence of corresponding experience can be provided, for example for 
Uganda. 
— A reduction in the transaction costs for the partner side and the donor is one of the 
best-known arguments of the advocates of PBAs (see Box 2). This means that due to 
a reduced number of intentions and common procedures of the donors, it is assumed 
that the costs might decrease recognizably, for example costs for the preparation of 
development cooperation negotiations, the large number of implementation activi-
ties and the monitoring. However, it has emerged that these costs cannot be reduced, 
at least in the short-term, since new communication mechanisms must be estab-
lished, new analytical instruments are required and the entire projects are much 
more complex (Killick 2003; Killick 2004; GTZ 2004). There is, however, a certain 
plausibility that (a) lower transaction costs are expected in the mid to long-term and 
(b) higher transaction costs for PBAs at the same time also produce an improvement 
in quality. 
— Donors must adjust themselves to the new procedure. Necessary above all here is 
know-how that covers budget questions as well as a presence on site in order to be 
able to accompany sectoral strategies, budget questions etc. continuously and ade-
quately. Also, for the analysis and evaluation of the budget management and capac-
ity building in this area, ownership by the partners and co-ordination of the donor 
activities are central. 
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Box 2: Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are costs that arise in order to enable the carrying out of market transactions. These costs 
do not depend on the production of goods, but on the transfer from one economic subject to another. Typi-
cal transactions arise through the search for current products and suppliers, the procurement of information 
about product qualities, costs of concluding contracts etc. If the number of transactions can be reduced, by 
individual transactions being consolidated into one transaction, naturally the transaction costs are also 
reduced. 
Transaction costs in the context of development cooperation relate to the preparation, the negotiation 
mechanisms, the implementation and the monitoring. In principle, in this, three categories of transaction 
costs may be distinguished (cf. Brown et al. 2000, 7 f.): 
Administration costs: These include primarily general administration costs for development coop-
eration, which in particular comprise wage costs. 
Indirect costs: These arise through the provision mechanisms of development cooperation. Exam-
ples of the coming into existence of indirect costs are: inconsistencies between development coopera-
tion and other public expenditures, undermining of ownership in the case of the partner, delays in 
payment. 
Opportunity costs: These relate to the possible losses of the resources used in comparison with an 
alternative use of resources (for example: use of working capacities of a government administration 
for development cooperation in comparison with other responsibilities). 
The only studya to date that attempts to obtain a quantitative overview of transaction costs is by Brown et 
al. (2000), carried out for Vietnam. In view of the enormous difficulties and often no longer available data 
on the recording of transaction costs it is evident, however, that a quantitative monitoring is not practica-
ble. 
a Cf. Oxford Policy Management / ODI 2002, 36 f. 
Source: Klingebiel 2003, 3 
Overall, no clear picture has emerged whether programme-oriented development coopera-
tion is “better” or “worse” than any other form of development cooperation. Last but not 
least, the initial and outline conditions of the partner countries and the partly very different 
procedures of the donors, which range from a gradual approach (for example Senegal) to a 
rapid reorientation of central donors (for example Uganda, Tanzania), makes the variety of 
influencing factors clear. 
In view of the well-known flaws in project-related approaches, the plausible long-term 
effects and the fundamentally more significant contribution of programme-oriented devel-
opment cooperation, in principle the approach offers development policy advantages. The 
concrete procedure and the possibilities of success naturally depend on the respective in-
dividual case. Budget support makes no sense, for example in countries without a corre-
sponding commitment and sufficient ownership. However, even in countries with difficult 
initial conditions, in principle, no good reason has been stated against joint financing for 
example – i.e. with very wide-reaching control mechanisms – by the donors. The initial 
conditions and goals for programme-oriented development cooperation should not be con-
fused with one another. This means fully functioning general accounting offices, sufficient 
planning capacities etc. cannot be made a precondition of programme-oriented develop-
ment cooperation, but are rather the result of the efforts. 
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